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Intro d uctio n  
Robert Gehl
In our digital media saturated lives, where we spend increasing 
amounts of time in “virtual worlds” such as Second Life or online on blogs 
and video sites, it can be easy to forget about public spaces. Unlike much 
content in virtual worlds, cultural programs in public spaces are events that 
are lived and experienced bodily and sensuously. Museum exhibits, public 
music performances, sports, arts festivals—these events and spaces are 
truly /mmediate, which is to say that they are lived bodily by those that 
participate in and produce them. While media might be involved, these 
phenomena are wholly different from broadcast mass media objects. This 
book, The Pol/t/cs o f  Cultural Programm/ng /n Publ/c Spaces, interrogates 
these events and spaces in order to discover—and recover—the ways in 
which they affect subjectivity. We offer this not in lieu of interrogations of 
our heavily mediated world, but as a reminder that public spaces and 
public events still matter to millions of people worldwide.
To this end, this collection groups together two seemingly different 
objects: events and institutions. Cultural events, such as festivals, protests, 
and concerts, are often considered one-time phenomena. Even events that 
are annual are seen as relegated to a brief period of time. Institutions, such 
as museums, are seen as more permanent, even timeless. Yet both are 
caught in complex political and economic webs, and both mutate through 
time as various constituencies struggle over their uses and meanings. 
Short-term events persist in cultural memory through news reports, 
eyewitness accounts, personal experience, and documentaries.1 Museums 
and exhibits, for all their persistence, often undergo turnover in personnel 
and subsequently are sites of shifting political and cultural mores.2 
Moreover, since this book deals with cultural programming in public 
spaces, all of the objects considered here are seen as intimately tied to 
heterogeneous geographical/political spaces. Seen in this light, drawing a 
distinction between, say a book festival and a sculpture garden, is more 
arbitrary than helpful. In the final analysis, no object is free of the web of 
determinations, and the essays in the book explore the ramifications of this 
fact.
2 Introduction
Ultimately, we see this collection as a contribution to a cultural studies 
of the politics of spaces. In spite of the wide range of objects in question, 
we’ve found that the authors here have demonstrated insight into the 
complex politics of a wide range of public spaces. We see their work as 
part of the tradition of theorists of spaces and modernity such as Walter 
Benjamin and Doreen Massey.
From Benjamin to Massey: 
W ithered Auras and Ludic Spaces
At first glance, a reading of Walter Benjamin's seminal essay “The 
work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction”3 might seem to be out 
of place in an introduction to a collection of essays on public spaces. 
Cultural studies and media studies rely on a key theoretical argument 
Benjamin makes in this essay: that the unique ‘aura’ of particular works of 
art has been eliminated (or, as he puts it, ‘withered’) since the advent of 
mass media production technologies such as film and photography. For 
example, the Mona Lisa is certainly regarded as a unique art work 
available only for viewing in the Louvre. However, Benjamin's argument 
is that an art work can be viewed anywhere a mechanical reproduction of it 
is available, thus removing that work from its hallowed space, 
recontextualizing it both anywhere and at the same time nowhere. To use a 
contemporary example, the Mona Lisa and many other works of art adorn 
dorm rooms, lobbies, postcards, and Web sites, thus reducing or 
eliminating the uniqueness or aura of the original. The aura of the original 
work, Benjamin argues, has been withered by mass reproduction and 
distribution.
What is germane here is not the focus on media but rather Benjamin's 
overall argument. In other words, he was not making an argument about 
art history or technological change; he was making a political argument 
about the spaces that held artworks, an argument with potential to wither 
the aura of space as well as art. In “The work of art in the age of 
mechanical reproduction,” Benjamin was concerned with a class of 
people—whom he called the priests—who oversaw the rituals involved in 
the worship of authentic works of art. They were involved in protecting the 
original works of art and codifying the consumption of art by the public. 
As Benjamin argues, the aura of a work of art arises from its ‘cult value’; 
priests controlled access to artworks, since cult artworks were dedicated to 
deities, not display. Some artworks remained hidden year-round. Thus, the 
spaces in which these works resided were strictly controlled, with the 
activities of any visitors to fall within the realm of spiritual protocol. It
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was this political and cultural limitation to access which hallowed both the 
artworks and the spaces they inhabited.
This cult value was destroyed by mechanical reproduction. The 
artwork could be removed from its surroundings via the processes of 
photography or film and displayed elsewhere, thus making scarce works of 
art banal and challenging the hallowed status of the spaces that contained 
them. Those technological processes contributed to the withering of the 
auras of those spaces and works. However, lest my rendering of his 
argument makes Benjamin appear to be a technological determinist, 
consider his emphasis on the agency of the publics who sought to shift the 
production of creative works away from the elite:
With the increasing extension of the press, which kept placing new 
political, religious, scientific, professional, and local organs before the 
readers, an increasing number of readers became writers—at first, 
occasional ones. It began with the daily press opening to its readers space 
for “letters to the editor.” And today there is hardly a gainfully employed 
European who could not, in principle, find an opportunity to publish 
somewhere or other comments on his work, grievances, documentary 
reports, or that sort of thing. Thus, the distinction between author and 
public is about to lose its basic character. The difference becomes merely 
functional; it may vary from case to case. At any moment the reader is 
ready to turn into a writer. As expert, which he had to become willy-nilly 
in an extremely specialized work process, even if only in some minor 
respect, the reader gains access to authorship.
While the technology of printing presses certainly had an effect upon the 
production of media, Benjamin focuses instead on what people who 
traditionally did not have access could do with the new opened media 
spaces. They have made headways into this space, undermining prior 
distinctions between writer and reader. Overall, Benjamin was less 
concerned about the technological changes in modernity and more 
concerned with the processes by which average people can destroy elite- 
approved auras and liberate objects—and as we will argue, spaces—from 
control by an elite. Predetermined readings and rituals of works and spaces 
become undermined by the playfulness of the public.
This is where Benjamin's important essay can contribute to the 
conversation about spaces in which this book takes part. In the case of the 
priesthood, their analogues abound in the realm of public spaces: city 
planners and committees, state actors, corporations, church leaders, the 
owners of private museums such as the Spy Museum. Returning to the 
example of the Mona Lisa, the Louvre can be seen as a highly ritualized 
space; the display of the Mona Lisa behind thick plexiglass at the end of
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an often crowded hallway is testament to this. The public-spaces- 
priesthood attempts to codify the ritualized use of their respective 
domains: in a city park, people are meant to relax between trips to work or 
shopping. In a museum, visitors are expected to absorb the pre-approved 
pedagogies of art and exhibition. In an office building, workers are 
expected to complete their duties.
However, as stultifying as any space might appear, these political 
structures can be just as malleable as the auras of artworks so long as 
multitudes realize their political potential to undermine or reshape the 
rituals proposed by the priesthood of administrators, political leaders, and 
bureaucrats. According to a compelling reading by Diane Morgan, 
Benjamin saw architecture as an artform/space which was a "dynamic, 
mobile, enlivening, ludic medium, akin to the cinematographic."4 As she 
argues:
Using, occupying, wearing and tearing buildings at different speeds, 
according to different rhythms—the rhythms of various work patterns, the 
varying speeds and intensities of radically different lifestyles and relational 
formations—humans appropriate architecture as an art-form. Architecture 
in turn permeates all aspects of human life: it also surrounds and impinges 
on the human as his environment, inducing different states of being, 
producing various atmospheres which modify him through the senses.5
The thread of this argument is not fully developed by Benjamin, but it 
is well developed by Doreen Massey.6 Her work, For Space, outlines a 
political method by which the aura of public spaces—their cult value as 
determined by elites—could be withered. For Massey, modernist thinking 
has typically viewed space as either conquered or waiting to be conquered, 
either by colonizers or by neoliberal capital (to use her examples). That is, 
space is subject to one, and only one, inevitable history: that of 
incorporation into the hegemony du jour. This, she argues, is a stifling 
conception of the historical and political possibilities of heterogeneous 
space. She argues that the history of any space has been seen by modernist 
thinkers to be in the control of elites and out of the control of the masses, 
and consequently this stultifies the political potentials of public spaces.
As Massey argues, the first step in producing a viable politics of spaces 
is to break them out of this conquered/to-be-conquered dichotomy. To do 
this, she argues that we have to think of spaces as heterogeneous, lively, 
and capable of having infinite histories. Massey sees the inevitable logics 
of capitalism burst asunder by the playfulness of myriad groups which co- 
create spaces. Despite the best attempts by city planners to program a
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particular culture in these spaces, Massey sees the potentials of countless 
groups to determine countless new histories.
The aura of public spaces is not withered by mechanical reproduction 
(despite the existence of simulacra in Las Vegas and Dubai), but rather by 
the emphasis and recognition of the lively heterogeneous stories and 
potentials of all actors within those spaces. This is a different process than 
mechanical reproduction, but its results are the same: the recognition of a 
wide range of subjects who can become critics, experts, revolutionaries, 
flaneurs and, yes, flaneuses within public spaces. This recognition negates 
the status of the priesthood. For example, in a city in the United States, the 
priesthood of city leaders might imagine an open space of benches and 
greenery as having one predetermined story, perhaps as an interstice for 
consumption at adjacent shops or as a site of programmed festivals, and 
thus they concentrate their regulations on ensuring that this particular 
ritual be the predominant mode of use for that space, prohibiting other 
uses. Activists might have other stories in mind; the open space could be a 
site of protest. Artists might see a canvass for anti-hegemonic expression. 
Parents might see a safe space for their children. Migrant workers might 
imagine a space where they could gather to share a sense of community 
organized in dependence upon and in opposition to the modes of 
employment available to them. The list is—and as Massey argues should 
be—long, lively, and unpredictable, mapping what she calls a "geography 
of relations" which overdetermines the space in question.7
Of course, neither Benjamin nor Massey present their visions in a 
vacuum; both are acutely aware of the powerful forces which continuously 
attempt and re-attempt to ritualize public spaces in particular ways. 
Benjamin looks with trepidation to the rise of a Fascist aesthetic which 
glorifies the mass-produced machines of war. He sees this form of 
mechanical reproduction as a threat to humanity. Massey's work is a 
philosophical polemic against a long tradition of modernist thinkers who 
have downplayed the political possibilities of public spaces. In both, there 
is always the specter that elites will regain power by predetermining the 
history of spaces and ritualizing their uses.
We present this collection of works as further contributions to this 
tradition. These works explore the conflict and contradiction between the 
visions of the elites who imagine spaces to have one history and various 
public actors who imagine other histories. Ultimately, in the spirit of 
Benjamin and Massey, these works trouble the very distinction between 
‘elite’ and ‘public,’ thus demonstrating the contingency in social structures 
which overdetermines the uses of public spaces. In some cases, the elites 
appear to have control; in other spaces, we see surprising acts of agency
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and imagination on the parts of workers, protesters, activists, and artists; 
and in others, we see these lines blurring and in flux, with their futures 
uncertain.
Outline of the book 
Part I: Imagining Space in the City
In this section, the authors explore the city, considering the multiple 
potential uses of space there. For example, Tim Gibson's chapter explores 
the manner in which city planners in Seattle worked to claim public spaces 
such as Westview Park for the particular needs of local businesses. By 
turning over city spaces to private “business improvement districts,” 
encouraging particular uses whilst displacing alternatives, and enforcing 
strict regulation against loitering, Seattle's leaders unwittingly made the 
public space safe for protesters to use during the 1999 "Battle in Seattle." 
The aura of safety, created by those planners who sought to ritualize 
particular uses of the park, led to 40,000 protesters utilizing Westview 
Park to launch a successful demonstration against the WTO. Here, the 
history of this space, which was imagined to be part of (and symbolic of) 
globalized capitalism, became instead a symbol of the anti-globalization 
movement. However, to this day the businesses in charge of Westview 
Park struggle with—and sometimes gain advantage over—the anti­
globalization protesters who attempt to hold political rallies on the 
anniversary of the WTO protests.
Fan Yang's chapter on the West Kowloon Cultural District in Hong 
Kong traces the competing desires of the city's administrators and the 
public. After the British relinquished control of Hong Kong, city 
administrators sought to establish themselves as world-class leaders of a 
cultural capital by creating a massive public space on the waterfront. To 
promote their vision, they sponsored a series of grand public events. 
According to Yang, their use of these spectacles was meant to distract the 
public, presenting an illusion of participation while eliding closed-door 
decision making. However, Yang also subtly elucidates the very real and 
very potent excitement of the public who vigorously sought to shape the 
outcome of the WKCD and did so through citizen's groups and activism. 
The imagined future of the West Kowloon waterfront oscillates between 
the elite vision of yet another landmark of globalized capitalism and a 
potential space for nascent civil society.
In her examination of several city festivals, Marina Peterson considers 
Los Angeles in a variety scales ranging from local to global. Her objects
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compel her to consider the desires of festival organizers and the often 
conflicting desires of festival participants. The festival organizers used the 
power of mapping and cultural programming to dictate the scope of the 
events; they sought to scale up Los Angeles from a collection of 
neighborhoods to a microcosm of the globe.
Chiara Bernasconi's chapter on Nu/t Blanche reads somewhat as a 
response to Peterson's. During the Nu/t Blanche art nights in various cities, 
participants used social technologies such as cell phones to map their own 
experiences of a major city festival. Bernasconi contrasts this spontaneous 
reorganization of the festival with the initial plans of the city 
administrators. Ultimately, she argues that festival planners must take into 
account—and now increasingly do take into account—the spontaneous use 
of social technologies and networks to enhance their events. Her findings 
illuminate the impact of social Web sites on our navigation of public 
spaces.
Part II: Intellectuals and Ideologies in Museums
This section focuses on museums. Susan Ashley's remarkable chapter 
highlights the importance of museum and historical site interpretation, a 
seemingly mundane, uncontroversial, and heretofore neglected part of any 
visit to those unique spaces. Alluding to Benjamin, Ashley notes that 
museums and historical sites have powerful auras which present their 
visions of events, history, and culture as unimpeachably true. The 
corporate and governmental groups which run these sites do so in keeping 
with hegemonic norms. However, what the authorities might not realize is 
that heritage interpreters—otherwise known as tour guides and reenactors— 
have powerful roles in revising and resisting dominant visions of those 
spaces. These workers are not necessarily there to personify the language 
of those in power, but rather see themselves as face-to-face provocateurs 
who seek to radically broaden the thinking of their audiences. Despite this 
autonomy, however, Ashley notes that the creeping logic of neoliberalism 
is threatening heritage interpreters' abilities to be radical teachers, 
particularly by replacing them with media displays which can be more 
closely monitored and monetized—a sort of inversion of Benjamin's 
argument in “The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction.”
Kimberly Williams's examination of the International Spy Museum in 
Washington, DC focuses on the pedagogical goals of that institution. 
Williams argues that, despite the institution's avowed mission of an 
objective history of espionage, it seeks to portray the Cold War as a 
righteous conflict which was won by the United States largely through
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covert actions. Through immersive and experiential exhibits, the museum 
presents the Soviet Union—and by extension any contemporary enemy of 
the United States—as feminized, irrational, and always dangerous. Her 
reading is against the intended grain of the museum, thus highlighting how 
archives of objects can be arranged and rearranged to produce a reality for 
museum visitors and how a visitor might pierce that reality.
Seth Feman's chapter on Alfred Barr is a careful examination of the 
Museum of Modern Art's permanent exhibits. Like Williams, Feman seeks 
to read this institution against the grain, challenging dominant scholarly 
interpretations of that space. His contribution is also notable because he 
reveals the sometimes conflicting desires of an elite who designs a public 
space, someone who is simultaneously “a Christian resolute about 
synthesizing his faith with modern art... an empiricist [and]... a Cold 
Warrior.” Feman's chapter thus reveals the cracks and hidden corners of an 
ostensibly smooth space: the pedagogical arrangement of art in the 
MoMA.
Part III: Making Space for Art and Politics
We close with an examination of artists and activists who create spaces 
for their political projects, even if those spaces are liminal and transient. 
Michelle Moravec's history of the Women's Art Building in Los Angeles, 
specifically that institution's Incest Awareness Project, presents public 
space not as an empirical object but as a process. In this light, space is 
made public because alternative stories are made possible within it, and 
then those stories—in the form of feminist art—can be retold elsewhere in 
many different settings. Public spaces, in her view, are not simply discrete 
sites. Instead, they are a process. They occur whenever an artist confronts 
her audience with challenging work and where the audience is welcomed 
into a process of apprehending the work and having their consciousness 
raised. Public space is decidedly not an interstice where certain activities 
(particularly consumption) are allowed and others (such as political speech) 
shunned.
Building on the theme of the processes by which artists confront 
audiences and thus create lively new public spaces, Victoria Watts's 
interview with artist Edgar Endress highlights his desire to draw subaltern 
groups into dialogue and sometimes conflict with dominant discourses. 
His work involves taking banal and liminal public spaces and using them 
as stages for performances. For example, he has done photography in 
South American marketplaces, asking people to don masks and play roles 
for a camera, getting his subjects to engage with the powerful mythologies
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they live every day. The masks encourage disenfranchised people to 
confidently perform in public spaces. His current work involves mobile 
performances, focusing in part on migrant workers in Washington, DC. 
His Floating Museum recreates the mobile sense of community 
engendered by taco trucks. As he explains, “There are more parking lots, 
more malls, more and more non-spaces in existence. I like the idea of 
taking that over, of putting something there that disappears in the 
landscape, in the architecture eventually.”
The final chapter, Katrina Enros's look at Montreal's Place des Arts, 
examines that institution's cultural history. The Place des Arts was 
founded during the mid-twentieth century Quiet Revolution, a time of 
Quebecois nationalism. As such, its design and leadership were subject to 
intense scrutiny by Quebecois who bristled at their lack of involvement in 
the founding. The 1963 opening of the Place was met with protests since 
much of the planning was done by English-speaking professionals from 
Canada and the United States. Enros situates the history of the Place 
within the greater context of other buildings which were reinvented by 
societies emerging from civil conflicts. Her ultimate argument is that 
transformation of the Place is possible, as long as the Quebecois do not 
turn their backs on the institution.
We offer these works as extensions of previous cultural studies 
interventions into the politics of public spaces. We recognize the power of 
media; how could we not, given the emphasis on virtual worlds, Web 2.0 
mass publishing, and citizen media? However, we want to also recognize 
(and perhaps return attention to) the immediacy of live bodies in public 
spaces working with and against cultural programming.
Notes
1 See Gibson's chapter for an examination of the persistence of short-term events.
2 For example, see Ashley, Williams, and Feman's chapters in this book.
3 Walter Benjamin. 2005. "The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction." 
Marxists Internet Archive. February 2005. Accessed online at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm.
4 Diane Morgan. “The Distractions of the Built Environment: Architecture as a 
Collective Work of Art.” InterCulture, no. Reproducing Art: Walter Benjamin’s 
Work of Art Essay Reconsidered Patricia Allmer and John Sears, eds. (2007): 1­
34. Accessed online at http://interculture.fsu.edu/pdfs/morgan%20diane.pdf
5 Morgan, "The distractions," 6.
6 Massey, Doreen B. For Space. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005).
7 Massey, For Space, 10.

P a r t  I:
Im a g in in g  Sp a c e  in  t h e  C it y
Chapter  On e
Public  Space a n d  the Fear  of Cities: 
The Politics of Cu ltura l  Program m ing  
in  Seattle’s W estlake  Park  
Tim othy  A. Gibso n
Looking back, it is difficult to believe that, in 1998, Seattle’s city 
boosters actually labored long and hard to lure the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to the Pacific Northwest. But labor they did. In fact, 
city leaders even drafted local celebrities (of a sort) to seal the deal, in one 
case handing visiting WTO dignitaries an official invitation signed by 
none other than Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates. According to editorial 
page writers at the time, hosting the 1999 WTO meetings in Seattle would 
send a bold statement to the world about the city’s newly minted world- 
class status. The WTO would “place Seattle at the focus of attention from 
the international business world,”1 thus signifying Seattle’s arrival as a 
“major world trading point.”2 The WTO meetings would, in short, serve as 
Seattle’s coming out party, and the whole world would be invited.
Things didn’t exactly work out as planned. Instead, labor, fair trade, 
and environmental activists flooded the streets, shut down the opening 
ceremonies, and transformed the event into a sometimes joyful, sometimes 
destructive, but always compelling “spectacle of the street.”3 By the end of 
the protests, when the pepper spray had cleared, riot police with gas masks 
stood guard over a smashed Niketown storefront, and ‘Seattle’ had become 
an international symbol not of high-tech capitalism but of a resurgent anti­
globalization movement.
To be sure, whatever global political significance these protests 
enjoyed depended in large measure upon the saturation media coverage 
they received, and they received this coverage in large part because they 
were indeed disruptive as well as, in some moments, violent and 
destructive. At the same time, however,, as DeLuca and Peeples note, this 
media coverage not only focused on violence and disorder, but it also 
addressed the grievances, slogans, and criticisms of the protestors. Indeed,
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they argue that without the protestor’s uncivil disobedience, none of these 
messages would have found their way onto the “public screen” and into 
the homes of millions of global citizens.4
Yet the stunning success of the WTO protests also depended on 
something else, something decidedly non-virtual and non-digital: access to 
urban public space. To attract media attention, protests certainly must be 
dramatic and spark conflict. But they must also be v/s/ble.5 This visibility, 
in turn, depends upon the presence of city spaces open to such public 
gatherings, preferably in well-traveled sections of the city, where the 
grievances of protestors can be quite literally seen. In the end, it is this 
interaction between real-world visibility in urban space and the power of 
mass media to project these images into virtual spaces that explains the 
efficacy of contemporary protest. Virtual space is emphatically not 
enough. Launching a new political website—even one that gets 40,000 hits 
its first day—is not news. Although certainly a public act, joining in an 
online political conversation occurs in private, most likely out of sight to 
all but the already-committed. Launching a protest of 40,000 people in the 
center of the city’s commercial district is a different story.
And so it was in Seattle. In the early afternoon of November 30, 1999, 
nearly 40,000 protestors converged on Westlake Park, downtown’s main 
civic square. Fresh off their early morning successes—which included 
disrupting the early sessions of the WTO meetings—most demonstrators 
hung out for a while in the park and then slowly found their way home. By 
the late afternoon, however, a remaining core of demonstrators—still 
thousands strong—found themselves confronted at the edge of the park by 
an overworked and agitated city police force determined to force them out 
of downtown. In response, protestors set dumpsters and trash bins on fire 
to form a crude barricade at Westlake’s southern end (the corner of 4th and 
Pike). Over the next hour, the Battle of Seattle ensued in earnest, with 
protestors throwing bottles and police lobbing tear gas and concussion 
grenades.6
Eventually, the police—reinforced by hastily mobilized units of the 
Washington National Guard—broke through the barricades, streamed into 
Westlake, and began arresting protestors en masse. By this time, however, 
the first day of the WTO was utterly disrupted, the Mayor humiliated, and 
what had begun as an attempt to project bold messages of Seattle’s 
entrepreneurial vigor to global audiences had turned into the signature 
moment of the anti-globalization movement. At the center of it all was 
Westlake Park, a tiny patch of public space in the heart of Seattle’s retail 
core.
14 Chapter One
In this chapter, I will argue that the ability of urban public spaces like 
Westlake Park to act as a vehicle for making political grievances and 
demands visible depends, somewhat paradoxically, on cultivating a sense 
of public order and safety. Abandoned urban spaces which inspire nothing 
among citizens but fear and loathing are poor candidates for spectacular 
protests. To be visible, protests require an audience, and to attract such a 
public, urban streets and parks must be marginally inviting and safe. And 
so it is that public fears of urban disorder become a key barrier to effective 
public protest.
Yet the manner in which order is maintained matters crucially. What 
we will discover is that, over the past thirty years, city officials and 
downtown business leaders have embarked on a series of strategies 
designed to restore public trust in the order and safety of urban public 
spaces—a sense of trust that had been largely undermined by decades of 
urban decline and capital disinvestment. Some of these strategies have 
been transparently exclusionary, aimed at keeping what developers call the 
‘undesirables’ at bay through a variety of aggressive architectural designs 
and policing strategies. Such policies attempt to reduce fear among people 
of ‘the right sort’ by excluding those of the ‘wrong sort.’ For obvious 
reasons, these are the kinds of coercive fear-reduction that have attracted 
the lion’s share of attention, (and justifiable ire), from critical urban 
scholars.7
Other fear-reduction strategies, however, are more subtle. These 
strategies involve the subtle commercialization of public space, linked in 
many cases to the development of new hybrid forms of public-private 
governance and a related desire to ‘program’ key public spaces with 
cultural events. In many American cities, officials have begun to turn the 
management of local parks over to privately-funded ‘business improvement 
districts’ in which local retailers and landowners agree to fund the 
maintenance of adjacent public spaces so long as they are allowed to exert 
control over how these spaces are maintained and used. Ultimately, this 
desire to bring public space into the service of commercial revitalization 
has led to calls for downtown parks to be ‘programmed’ year-round with 
concerts and corporate-sponsored events—all designed to lure shoppers 
and regional tourists away from suburban malls and back into downtown 
shopping spaces.8
But what happens when the desire to offer cultural programs in public 
parks—in pursuit of either community or commercial goals—competes 
with, and perhaps even begins to displace, spontaneous political speech 
and organized protests? There are, in short, political consequences to 
cultural programming in public spaces, and nowhere can these consequences
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be seen more obviously than in the recent history of Westlake Park in 
Seattle. This chapter therefore explores the complex political and 
ideological tensions at play in the call to increase cultural programming in 
urban public spaces. In particular, this chapter will discuss what happened 
when city leaders, citing the need to protect the park’s popular holiday 
carousel (sponsored by Qwest©), denied a permit to activists organizing a 
rally marking the anniversary of the WTO protests. Drawing on this case 
study, this chapter will conclude by exploring how this turn to cultural 
programming is linked not merely to the commercial motives of retailers 
but more fundamentally to wider fears about social disorder in the 
American urban landscape.
Fear and Loathing in Public Space
As the WTO protests highlighted, one of the most crucial functions of 
public space in a democracy is to act as what Don Mitchell calls, following 
Henri Lefebvre and Iris Marion Young, a space o f representation—a space 
where groups of individuals can assemble, constitute themselves as a 
distinct group, and make their presence (and their demands) visible to a 
wider public.9 At the same time, however, it must be recognized that 
public space serves far more than a purely democratic function. Indeed, 
one of the key virtues of, for example, a city park is that it acts as a 
‘commons,’ that is, as a resource held by all, open to all, which can then be 
devoted to the pursuit of a wide range of goals and pleasures. Most of 
these goals and pleasures are resolutely mundane and very few of them 
have to do with political speech or politics in any direct way. Eating lunch, 
entertaining children, sitting in the sun, asking for change, people 
watching, scheduling a rendezvous—such are the quotidian uses of urban 
public space.10
Further, as Jane Jacobs famously argued, it is precisely this diversity of 
use that lends healthy public streets and spaces a sense of order and 
safety.11 A well-traveled and well-maintained space, one open to a 
diversity of uses across both day and night, nurtures a web of informal 
surveillance. In this web, we all keep an eye on each other, and this tacit 
policing helps discourage crime and the kinds of disorderly behavior that 
instill fear among urban residents and visitors. Moreover, this diversity of 
use—and the web of surveillance it creates—further supports the ability of 
public spaces to act as an effective forum for political speech, for visibility 
depends upon a public who feels safe enough to assemble.
In the U.S., however, the ability of urban public spaces to support these 
diverse uses has been under assault during the past four decades. Topping
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the list of threats has been the long-term withdrawal of federal and local 
governments from the production and maintenance of urban public space. 
This withdrawal has its roots, of course, in the by-now familiar story of 
postwar urban decline.12 As Dennis Judd and Todd Swanstrom describe, 
the global economic crisis of the early 1970s—an era of declining 
corporate profits, oil shocks, high inflation, and escalating class struggle— 
quickly translated into a public fiscal crisis at both the federal, state, and 
local levels. The response of the neoliberal Reagan administration was 
brutal fiscal retrenchment, expressed most directly by draconian cuts to 
social services and urban development programs.13
It was not a good time to be a big city mayor. Facing both cuts in 
federal aid and declining tax revenues due to the flight of manufacturing 
jobs and rapid suburbanization, city leaders of whatever political stripe 
were forced into cruel austerity-style budgets, cutting expenditures in 
some cases between 15 and 20 percent during a time when demands for 
services and assistance rose to 40-year highs.14 Predictably, in most cities, 
the parks budget—viewed as a luxury compared to fire and police—was 
the first to face draconian cuts.15 In the end, when the era of massive cuts 
ebbed during the late 1990s, one national study found that an infusion of 
$30.7 billion would be required simply to address the deferred maintenance 
needs of existing urban parks.16
The consequences of these cuts were profound. In Philadelphia, for 
example, the parks budget shrunk from three percent of total city 
expenditures in the late 1960s to less than one percent by 2000. During 
this time, successive mayors eliminated the parks police and cut the 
maintenance staff by over two-thirds.17 Today, as Alec Brownlow 
describes, only the “crown jewels” of the city park system—those high 
profile parks frequented by tourists and commuters—receive adequate 
care, while the remainder of the system has been left to rot. As a result, 
neighborhood parks like Cobbs Creek in West Philadelphia—public 
spaces that once supported a wide range of uses and users—have now 
become menacing and abandoned landscapes. Weeds have overgrown 
playfields, burned-out auto husks block park footpaths, and, as Brownlow 
discovered in his focus groups with local residents, Philadelphians who 
once used such parks as kids would never dream of letting their own 
children play there. And they have good reason: corpses are discovered at 
Cobbs Creek at a rate of about one per year.18
The vicious circle that consumed Cobbs Creek Park—this cycle of 
neglect, fear, and abandonment—has been repeated countless times across 
the urban landscape, as urban residents take stock of the declining 
condition of parks and express their dismay by avoiding them entirely.
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Urban residents, in short, construct personal geographies of risk from 
whatever bits of social information are available to them—from personal 
experience to neighborhood gossip to the relentless portrayal of crime and 
violence on local television news.19 The physical appearance of public 
spaces thus offers interpretive cues for residents looking to predict when, 
and under what conditions, they can safely occupy particular city spaces.20 
As the signs of disorder and dysfunction proliferate due to deferred 
maintenance and inadequate policing, the public responds with fear and 
avoidance.21 In this way, overgrown grass around a jungle gym can 
suggest to parents not merely a history of shoddy maintenance, but also 
that the playground has been abandoned by other families and must 
therefore be unsafe.22 Unchecked graffiti and illegal dumping can signify 
not merely a breakdown in urban civility, but also, and more importantly, 
that public authorities care little for this space, and, by extension, the 
people within it. Should we be surprised when residents respond to these 
signs by re-shaping their daily rounds in order to avoid and abandon these 
neglected and disorderly spaces?23
And here we arrive at the dicey politics that goes with discussing the 
connections between fear and disorder in city space. These are, after all, 
precisely the connections made by the recent generation of neo­
conservative American mayors—including most famously, former New 
York mayor Rudy Guiliani—to defend their ‘zero tolerance’ policies 
toward unlicensed homeless encampments, aggressive panhandling, and 
other ‘quality of life’ crimes.24 Drawing on Wilson and Kelling’s “broken 
windows” theory of urban crime,25 these mayors argued that both physical 
disorder (e.g., graffiti) and disorderly behavior (e.g., public drinking and 
aggressive panhandling) should be viewed not merely as the small stuff of 
gritty urban life, but rather as public enemy number one. In their view, 
disorder and incivility in urban space cultivates fear among the 
‘legitimate’ public. It sparks a reaction of avoidance and withdrawal. In 
turn, this withdrawal of the ‘law-abiding,’ as former Seattle City Attorney 
Mark Sidran (a broken windows devotee) put it, not only removes the 
informal surveillance and social control that individuals exert on one 
another in public places, but it also attracts true criminals who rightly 
conclude that public spaces traversed only by the intimidated and afraid 
are good places to do business.26
Liberal and progressive critics of Guiliani and broken windows theory 
more generally dismiss this discussion of disorder and fear as a transparent 
attack on the poor and homeless, and of course this complaint hits the 
mark.27 When proponents of broken windows theory define disorder as 
“behavior out of place,” they implicitly equate homelessness itself with a
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lack of order and control.28 To be homeless, as Don Mitchell has argued, is 
to be forced to attend to private needs (sleeping, dressing, urinating, etc.) 
in full public view. By definition, then, homelessness violates the orderly 
division of public and private spheres in bourgeois societies. To then 
criminalize these behaviors as part of a ‘zero tolerance’ campaign to ‘take 
back’ the streets—especially in the absence of a concerted effort to provide 
housing, food, and public health services—is, in a word, inhuman.29
At the same time, to object to a particularly noxious political use of 
broken windows theory—in this case, to criminalize urban poverty and 
homelessness—should not lead us to dismiss out of hand the connections 
between disorder, fear, and abandonment. Nor should it lead us to 
minimize the consequences of fear and abandonment on the quality of 
urban life more generally. We should never forget, in other words, that the 
consequences of the neglect and abandonment of urban public spaces are 
felt most keenly by women,30 the elderly, and the poor and working-class.
If parks become unusable due to physical decay or chronic incivility, 
the affluent, after all, can afford to join private recreation clubs. If things 
get really bad, they can seal themselves off from city streets with private 
security systems or escape altogether by fleeing into gated suburbia. When 
public spaces deteriorate, however, the poor are often stuck in place. They 
most likely make do by staying home. As Eric Klinenberg describes, a 
particularly dramatic example of this class dichotomy—and the tragic 
consequences of the fear of urban public space—came during the Chicago 
heat wave of 1995. During this week of triple-digit temperatures, hundreds 
of elderly Chicagoans—mostly poor, mostly African-American— 
remained so afraid of street crime that they barricaded themselves in their 
apartments and refused to leave, even as city officials pleaded with them to 
make their way to a cooling shelter. By the end of the week, over 700 
elderly residents were found dead in their homes, killed by the stifling
heat.31
The consequences of disorderly public spaces and the fear they 
generate are, in short, troubling to all who love city life. Not only do 
disorderly and ill-maintained spaces spark a vicious cycle of fear and 
abandonment, but the withdrawal of the public has a further noxious 
effect. It undermines the ability of spaces to serve as an effective stage for 
political spectacle and protest. To make political demands and grievances 
visible requires a public gathered in witness. In this way, the extent to 
which the public retreats behind the safety of a dead-bolted front door 
marks the extent of the public realm’s atrophy. The fear and withdrawal of 
the public from public spaces thus is a real problem demanding a real 
solution. What we will discover, however, is that the dominant solutions
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advanced by city officials across the U.S.—in close consultation with 
downtown business leaders who are focused, as always, on drawing every 
available resource into the circuit of accumulation and exchange—do little 
to restore the ability of public space to serve as effective vehicles of 
political speech and spectacle.
Public Space and Cultural Programming: 
Taking Back the City, One Fashion Show at a Time
Downtown merchants and landowners have long regarded public parks 
and streets with skepticism bordering on hostility. Part of the problem, 
from the perspective of adjacent landowners, is that these spaces lie 
beyond their control. According to federal law, parks and streets have from 
time immemorial been held in common by the state for public use. The 
public’s free access to these spaces thus enjoys the most rigorous 
protection offered by the U.S. legal system, and attempts to regulate the 
use of streets and parks are given careful judicial scrutiny.32 Private 
merchants and landowners, however, are accustomed to a different regime 
of spatial regulation—the regime of private property. Private property, 
after all, is based on the right to exclude.33 This principle of exclusion thus 
confers upon the property owner a powerful set of rights. Within some 
very wide limits, owners can create whatever ‘public’ they wish within 
their properties, merely by including some persons and activities while 
excluding others.34 The urban form is thus marked by an inherent tension 
between contradictory but perpetually juxtaposed regimes of inclusion and 
exclusion.
The tensions between inclusive and exclusive regimes of governing 
urban space have only been exacerbated in recent years with the 
widespread perception (held with particular zeal by downtown merchants) 
that urban public streets and parks have slipped beyond the control of 
public authorities. Downtown merchants, in short, are painfully aware that, 
due to thirty years of urban disinvestment and decline, central city 
districts, and especially public parks and streets, have become infused in 
the public imaginary with connotations of decay and danger.35 Merchants 
also recognize that the disorderly and ill-maintained condition of adjacent 
public parks and streets does little to inspire wary suburbanites, not to 
mention tourists and business travelers, to venture into struggling 
downtown shopping districts. For this reason, public space is often viewed 
by the pillars of the downtown business establishment as something of a 
problem to be solved. How, in short, can public spaces in key downtown 
districts be managed in ways that support, rather than undermine, the
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economic imperatives of retailers and landowners? How can these public 
spaces be governed in a way that resembles, at least in outline, the total 
control private owners exert over their own spaces?
Among the business class, then, one prominent response to the 
‘problem’ of public space has been to encourage the re-design of public 
spaces in ways that seal off ‘legitimate’ users from contact with the 
‘outside’ public. We see this strategy most forcefully in privately-owned 
corporate plazas that are nonetheless open to the public. As Gregory 
Smithsimon reports, although developers voluntarily built these quasi­
public spaces (usually to win density concessions from city planners), they 
viewed these plazas as burdensome obligations and often commanded their 
architects to design them in ways that discouraged public use.36 In many 
cases, architects responded by mercilessly deleting from their designs 
anything remotely resembling a place to sit so that pedestrians would have 
little reason to venture off the sidewalk and into the plaza. In other cases, 
an ingenious combination of plantings, tile styles, blank walls, and 
elevation differentials subtly signaled to outsiders that these ostensibly 
public spaces (often located at the base of an office tower) were more for 
the white-collar workers inside the building than the public milling on the 
street.37
Such tactics are not confined to office tower plazas. Local business 
leaders can also use their considerable influence in local government to 
ensure that city parks also repel unwanted users. For example, Straeheli 
and Mitchell write that when developers of Horton Plaza— San Diego’s 
signature downtown shopping mall—complained that users of nearby 
Horton Plaza Park were engaging in disruptive and disorderly activities, 
city planners responded by essentially making the park uninhabitable. 
They removed park benches, moved bus stops, and replaced the park’s 
inviting grass with prickly plants and flowers.38 In the end, such coercive 
re-designs bristle with hostility to the street and the general public. They 
represent nothing less than a transparent attempt to speed flows of 
legitimate users into the private spaces of retailers and developers while at 
the same time sealing these users off from unplanned and unpredictable 
encounters in a public sphere viewed as hostile and dysfunctional.39
In recent years, however, downtown business leaders have begun to 
embrace alternative means of exerting control over adjacent public spaces. 
This shift in strategy marks a shift in the prevailing philosophy of control 
from a policy of coercion and exclusion (through aggressive designs and 
policing) toward appropriation and governance.40 It is, in short, a shift 
from thinking of public space as less a problem to be contained and more 
as an under-utilized resource to be incorporated, transformed, and then
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pressed into the service of developers and retailers.
The heart of this strategy was expressed forcefully twenty years ago by 
the influential urbanist William H. Whyte. If you are worried about the ill- 
maintained condition of parks and the disorderly ‘undesirables’ who 
congregate there, don’t sweep away the public en masse using coercive 
and uninviting designs. That’s throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
Instead, he wrote, “the best way to handle the problem of undesirables is to 
make the place attractive to everyone else.”41 Drawing implicitly on Jane 
Jacobs’ famous descriptions of the “dance of the street” in Greenwich 
Village, Whyte argued that well-used spaces are safe spaces. As the public 
masses in place, the space becomes self-policing. Gathered in sufficient 
numbers, people feel emboldened to check one another, to enforce 
prevailing social norms. The key is therefore to find some way to restore 
public confidence in public spaces, to draw the crowds in and to make 
them feel comfortable enough to stay.
Furthermore, a ‘reclaimed’ park that is well-used and lively could yield 
economic benefits as well. It could, in fact, offer jaded suburban shoppers 
and tourists something unique—an experience of diversity and urbanity 
wholly distinct from the blandness of suburban box stores and outlet malls. 
If planned and maintained correctly, in other words, urban parks and 
streets could become—along with the de rigueur professional sports 
arenas, festival marketplaces, aquaria, IMAX theaters, and brew pub 
restaurants—a key resource in what David Harvey has called “the 
mobilization of spectacle,” in which city boosters project bold images of 
urban vitality in regional and international markets to draw in consumers, 
tourists, and investors.42
Yet, from the perspective of retailers and landowners, transforming 
streets and parks into spectacles of urban vitality requires first that they be 
reclaimed and controlled. A lack of faith in the local state’s ability to 
reestablish this kind of control has thus led city business leaders to develop 
alternative strategies of governance—strategies that place the maintenance 
and control of public streets and parks into the hands of private 
associations of landowners and businesses. The proliferation of ‘business 
improvement districts’ (BIDs) across the American urban landscape offers 
one key example of this process. Nominally creations of local and state 
legislation, BIDs are essentially local associations of landlords and 
business owners who agree to assess themselves a special tax, over and 
above their usual local and state taxes. The funds generated from this 
special assessment are then poured into the BID, an organization 
controlled not by local government, but by a private board of governors 
elected from among the property holders within the district (tenants
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usually need not apply). This money can then be used to pay for the 
maintenance, policing (via private security), and redevelopment of public 
spaces within the boundaries of the BID.43
In essence, then, the development of the BID represents an abdication 
of public responsibility—and with this transfer of responsibility comes the 
inevitable transfer of authority and control. As the BID begins to assume 
duties—planning, sanitation, maintenance, policing—once shouldered by 
the local state, business leaders feel emboldened to use their influence to 
shape the design and use of urban parks and streets more to their liking.
Consider the example of Bryant Park in midtown Manhattan. 
Established in 1934 as a pastoral haven from the surrounding city, Bryant 
Park’s original designers purposefully cut the park off from its 
surroundings by encircling it with walls and lowering its plane relative to 
the street. Fifty years later, William Whyte blamed this design for the 
park’s takeover by drug dealers, who used the park’s relative isolation 
from the street to their advantage.44 Enter the Bryant Park Restoration 
Corporation (BPRC)—a non-profit BID whose board members included 
some of the largest telecommunications firms in the nation. With the 
resources of these powerful firms in hand, the BPRC engaged in an 
aggressive re-design of the Park, with a focus on cultivating, through every 
means available, a sense of security and safety. Private security guards 
were hired. Strict rules on overnight camping and panhandling were 
enforced. The park’s new architectural and landscape design emphasized 
security as well, mostly by opening up the space to the surrounding streets 
to reduce the sense of isolation that frightened legitimate users while 
pleasing local drug dealers.45
Yet perhaps the most notable feature of Bryant Park’s redesign lay in 
the BPRC’s decision to ‘program’ the park as a means of attracting users 
of the ‘right sort.’ Following Whyte’s advice that ‘undesirables’ are best 
repelled by making the park attract/ve to others, the BPRC brought in, first 
of all, kiosks selling all manner of yuppie-pleasing items, including the 
required tumblers of cappuccino. Two expensive private restaurants 
opened on site as well, providing another destination for midtown’s 
business class. And then there are the events. A visit to park 
management’s website reveals a summer schedule of over 15 events per 
week, from “HBO’s Film Festival” to “Broadway in Bryant Park” to 
“GoodMorn/ng America's Summer Concert Series.” Most events are free 
and open to the public, but most also have corporate sponsors. All event 
organizers pay a fee to access the park, and park rules even allow for some 
events to charge admission. In fact, perhaps the signature event in Bryant 
Park’s calendar—the Mercedes-Benz© Fashion Week—is completely
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closed to the public and colonizes the park for two weeks per year.46 In the 
end, as Zukin writes, such events are part of a larger strategy of 
“pacification by cappuccino”—her term for the subtle use of lifestyle cues 
and urban semiotics to signal for whom this park is intended.47
If Bryant Park’s redesign was established on the foundation of private 
control and a commitment to cultural programming, we can see a similar 
process at work in Seattle’s Westlake Park. Over the years, the downtown 
business community has developed an uneasy relationship to the park, and 
this tension has its origins in the park’s early history. The idea for 
Westlake Park was the brainchild of Victor Steinbrueck, an architecture 
professor, who first proposed in 1968 that the city establish a grand 
European-style civic square at the intersection of Westlake Avenue and 
Pine Street. Soon, the plan gained enough traction to inspire the animosity 
of the downtown retailers, who expressed fears about how the park might 
disrupt the flow of downtown traffic and also serve as a congregation point 
for the city’s homeless. The Downtown Seattle Association (the main 
business association for downtown retailers and landowners and a powerful 
player in Seattle city politics) thus quickly countered Steinbrueck’s vision 
for Westlake with their own proposal to build a massive hotel-retail 
complex at the site.48
The debate raged on for ten years until, eventually, downtown business 
leaders pressured former Mayor Charles Royer, an early advocate of 
creating the park, into a compromise. Under Royer’s plan, half of 
Steinbrueck’s civic plaza would be devoted instead to a $110 million 
office tower and upscale shopping mall. The other half of the square, 
essentially two small tiled plazas on either side of Pine Street, would be set 
aside as public spaces—and, with one plaza remaining in private hands, in 
fact, only the plaza on the south side of the street would become a full- 
fledged public park. In the end, Royer’s vision for Westlake—opened to 
the public in 1988—was, in one local journalist’s words, “mostly mall and 
office building, with two patches of park on what’s left over.”49
Having pared Steinbrueck’s vision down to size, the downtown 
business community then set about the task of ensuring the park served the 
priorities of neighboring retailers. One major opportunity came in 1996 
with the formation of the inelegantly named Westlake Park Management 
Review Task Force. Created by a joint agreement between the city of 
Seattle and the Downtown Seattle Association and stacked with 
representatives from neighboring retailers, the task force was challenged to 
develop ideas for improving the park’s maintenance and management. 
Under the guiding hand of the DSA, however, the task force’s final report
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moved well beyond this initial charge and instead offered a bold proposal 
that called for a thoroughgoing privatization of the park.
First, the task force called for the park’s management to be turned over 
to a private, non-profit organization—tentatively dubbed (wait for it) 
“Westlake Park, Inc.”50 Funded from a mixture of public and private funds 
(and governed by a board dominated by retailers and developers) Westlake 
Park, Inc. would be given the authority to “establish use guidelines and 
standards, to issue permits [for events and protests], and to decorate and 
improve the park.” At the top of Westlake Park, Inc.’s proposed to-do list 
would be to ensure the park “complement surrounding businesses,” mostly 
by achieving “standards of presentation...comparable to private business 
standards for customer spaces.” Indeed, the report called for the park to 
establish its own ‘brand,’ complete with a distinctive floral logo.51
But perhaps most of the task force’s energies were devoted to 
promoting cultural programming as a means of revitalizing both the park 
and the surrounding retail core. Under the city’s lackluster stewardship, 
the task force argued, Westlake Park typically hosted events only during 
July and December. Under Westlake Park Inc., however, the park would 
establish instead a “year-round program plan.” Such a schedule of 
events—from puppet shows to cultural festivals to sand castle contests— 
would encourage the public to “think of the park as an active place where 
there is always something happening.”52 Moreover, a rich schedule of 
cultural programs would also present Westlake Park, Inc. with an 
opportunity to generate some revenue. All that would be required would 
be to schedule a number of for-profit events, including corporate-sponsored 
promotions, outdoor fashion shows, rock concerts with admissions fees, 
and perhaps even weddings and coming-out parties. This rental income 
would then flow back into the park’s maintenance and security budget, 
thereby reducing the need for future public and private funding.53
Ultimately, the bold idea of Westlake Park, Inc. died on the vine. What 
at first seemed a foregone conclusion (city staffers had gone so far as to 
write up the authorizing legislation) was derailed when a public backlash 
materialized, led in this case by a scathing editorial in the usually pro-DSA 
Seattle Times.54 Yet, this setback notwithstanding, the commitment to 
cultural programming at Westlake has remained strong among Seattle’s 
downtown establishment, reappearing again and again in subsequent 
City/DSA policy statements on downtown parks.55
This enthusiasm for cultural programming at Westlake can be 
explained by the way it serves, from the perspective of neighboring 
businesses, a number of important purposes. Scheduling events in urban 
public space offers suburban shoppers a reason to hazard a trip downtown,
